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Executive Summary 
In this article, we define good scholarship, highlight our points of disagreement with 
Locke and Latham (2009), and call for further academic research to examine the full range of 
goal setting’s effects. We reiterate our original claim that goal setting, like a potent medication, 
can produce both beneficial effects and systematic, negative outcomes (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), and as a result, it should be carefully prescribed and closely 
monitored. 
In 1999, the FDA approved Merck’s arthritis drug Vioxx. Through clinical drug trials, 
Vioxx had been subjected to rigorous tests and careful research. Soon after approval, however, 
Merck began to receive anecdotal evidence about patients who suffered heart attacks while 
taking the drug. Of course, many people suffer from cardiovascular disease and heart attacks are 
multiply determined. How then, should executives at Merck respond? Since Vioxx had already 
been subjected to rigorous testing, should the “anecdotal evidence” be dismissed? Or, should 
Merck conduct additional research exploring the possible link between Vioxx and heart disease? 
And, even before there is definitive proof linking Vioxx and heart disease, is it reasonable for 
doctors to become more wary of prescribing the drug? 
Locke and Latham (2009) deem anecdotes unworthy of academic attention. Further, 
Locke and Latham (2009) argue that as long as the benefits of a strategy are causally determined, 
while the negative effects have been shown in only a few causal studies along with many 
anecdotal accounts, we should dismiss the negative findings. 
We profoundly disagree. We think that qualitative analyses, case studies, journalistic 
accounts, and anecdotes should all be used to raise questions, focus attention, and develop ideas 
that should be subjected to rigorous, causal analyses.   
We believe that our disagreements with Locke and Latham highlight not only our 
differences about goal setting, but also about what constitutes good scholarship. In this response 
to Locke and Latham (2009), we articulate the aims of our first article (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), describe points of disagreement with Locke and Latham (2009), 
offer a definition of good scholarship, and suggest a program of research for future goal setting 
studies. 
Our Objectives 
We wrote our initial article (Ordóñez et al., 2009) within the context of the existing goal 
setting literature and the ubiquitous use of goals in managerial practice. We did not aspire to 
review—yet again—the goal setting literature. Instead, our aim was to raise questions, suggest 
caution, and issue a call for future research. To convey our message, we invoke a metaphor:  goal 
setting as a prescription strength medication that has both powerful positive effects and 
formidable negative side-effects.  
Although most goal setting studies have documented beneficial effects, we believe that 
anecdotes and empirical results linking goals with harmful outcomes deserve much more 
attention and more systematic research. Given that one large negative effect can overwhelm the 
influence of many positive effects, our aim was simply to state that the possibility of systematic 
harm resulting from goal setting merits far greater academic scrutiny and managerial attention. 
Points of Disagreement with Locke and Latham (2009) 
Anecdotal evidence. Locke and Latham (2009) dismiss our concerns about goal setting 
by conveying the impression that the foundation for our thesis rests almost entirely on a few 
anecdotes. Locke and Latham (2009) seek to persuade the reader on this point through shear 
repetition: “largely anecdotes,” “treating anecdotes as evidence,” “reporting selected ‘war 
stories’.” Locke and Latham (2009) claim that we believe “research is to be ignored and news 
reports are to be embraced,” and that “it is incomprehensible that scholars, rather than subject 
their speculation to programmatic research, would simply rely on stories in news periodicals.” 
In response, we offer three replies.  First, Locke and Latham's (2009) characterization of 
our view of scholarship: “research is to be ignored and news reports are to be embraced,” is 
simply wrong. There is mounting causal evidence linking goal setting with a range of behaviors 
including a shift in risk taking (Larrick, Heath, & Wu, in press), greater unethical behavior 
(Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004), and a narrow focus that draws attention from other 
important elements of the problem (Staw & Boettger, 1990).  Ordóñez et al. (2009) cite these and 
other empirically-based articles that demonstrate a causal link between goal setting and harmful 
behavior. 
Second, we continue to believe that anecdotes, case studies, and journalistic accounts can 
inform important research questions. Do anecdotes prove causality? Of course not. Can 
anecdotes help spotlight issues that merit caution and further investigation? Absolutely. Both in 
our initial article and here we explicitly call for further research.  
Third, what should we do as the anecdotal evidence continues to mount? For example, 
consider General Motors’ use of goal setting in 2002. At that time, GM had 28.2% of the car and 
light truck market in the United States. GM executives set a specific, stretch goal of capturing 
29% of the market. To gain commitment to this goal, G.M. executives wore pins with the 
numeral ''29'' (Maynard, 2002). In an effort to reach this goal, GM expanded its offering of 
interest free loans and “no money down” incentives. As GM lost money on a per unit basis, few 
executives stopped to focus on the implications of this narrow goal. “Fixated on this target, the 
firm went on to make decision after disastrous decision that helped drag it to the brink of 
bankruptcy” (“The perils of goal-setting,” 2009).  GM may never achieve their goal of 29% 
market share, but in pursuit of this specific, stretch goal, GM executives damaged the 
profitability of a once great company. 
Or, consider HUD’s low-income lending goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  These 
specific, stretch goals significantly expanded in 2001-2003 (e.g., a goal of at least 20 percent of 
mortgage purchases dedicated for low- or very low-income families in low-income areas, 
compared to a corresponding goal of 14 percent in 1997-2000), pushing Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to make many risky and unprofitable loans. Since the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in 2008, it is clear that these stretch goals at Fannie and Freddie have had huge implications 
for American tax payers.   
Are these stories of GM and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac anecdotes?  Yes.  Should these 
accounts cause us to think more carefully about how we set and use goals? Yes.  And, do we still 
need more research on goal setting?  Absolutely! 
Minimizing the problem. In reference to Schweitzer et al. (2004) documenting a causal 
relationship between goals setting and cheating, Locke and Latham (2009) respond “fair enough, 
but is this a typical finding?”  It is not a typical finding, but this is our point. If further work 
examined goal setting under conditions that permitted cheating, we postulate that findings 
linking goals with cheating might be far more typical than Locke and Latham suppose. 
Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and we call on scholars studying goal setting to design 
studies that allow for and measure a wide range of goal setting effects (including intrinsic 
motivation, cheating, and risk tolerance).   
New evidence. Locke and Latham (2009) criticize our Academy of Management 
Perspectives article for not reporting results from new studies. Though it should be apparent to 
any reader of the Academy of Management Perspectives, our aim was not to report new studies. 
Consistent with the journal’s objectives (from the AMP website), we aimed to “make 
information about empirical research in management accessible to the non-expert.” Suggesting 
that our article somehow fell short for failing to report new data misrepresents the mission of the 
journal. 
Originality. After thoroughly criticizing our conclusions, Locke and Latham then support 
the very claims we propose by stating that they “were among the first to alert practitioners to the 
possible dangers of setting goals.” We agree and cited them in our original paper. However, their 
prior work falls short. They offer an incomplete account of the hazards of setting goals and 
convey the impression that these problems are minor, and unworthy of significant concern and 
future research.  
In contrast, we postulate that goal setting may cause deep, systematic problems far more 
serious than prior work suggests. We postulate that the mild “solutions” Locke and Latham 
propose, most of them untested, may fail to solve these problems.  In addition, the goal setting 
“pitfalls” Locke and Latham identify have generated surprisingly little research attention from 
leading goal setting scholars. Thus, we continue to call for more research that allows equal 
measurement of the potential negative side effects.  
Out of context. When should goals be used? After accusing us of selectively citing 
sources, Locke and Latham (2009) quote us out of context. They suggest that we propose that 
“goals should be used only in the narrowest of circumstances.” Though this might possibly be 
true, what we actually stated was the following: 
In particular, we encourage managers to ask themselves the questions listed in 
Table 1 when considering the use of goals.  This cautious approach to setting 
goals is consistent with King and Burton’s (2003) claim that goals should be used 
only in the narrowest of circumstances. 
Until further research is conducted, we are not able to articulate when goal setting should 
be implemented, when it should be abandoned, and under which conditions goal setting can 
achieve its aims with as few side-effects as possible.  
Good Scholarship 
Defining Scholarship. Although good scholarship can take many forms, a necessary 
condition for good scholarship is asking interesting questions which address important issues 
and/or challenge existing beliefs.  
A second component of good scholarship is generating new knowledge. New knowledge 
changes the way individuals think about a problem or solve a vexing conundrum. New 
knowledge often emerges not from an individual study but across studies, across researchers, and 
across methodologies. Sometimes it emerges through theoretical analysis and other times 
through empirical research. There are many approaches to generating new knowledge, and 
different approaches offer trade-offs. For example, laboratory research may establish internal 
validity at the expense of external validity.   
A third component of good scholarship, especially in the social sciences, is sound 
empirics. Whether scholars measure or manipulate constructs, it is important that these 
constructs accurately reflect underlying conceptual variables. Careful scholarship establishes 
causal relationships by disentangling confounds, ruling-out competing explanations, and 
maintaining internal consistency.  
A fourth component of good scholarship is generating implications. Good scholarship has 
implications for theory, practice, or both. 
Finally, good scholarship is broadly disseminated and widely consumed. Most typically, 
scholars convey new ideas through effective writing and speaking in prominent forums and 
outlets.  
Producing Good Scholarship. Good scholarship is the product of healthy academic 
environments, ones in which curious scholars with open minds and different perspectives are 
encouraged to vet ideas. Ultimately, this vetting process will produce new knowledge.  
Within our institutions, we have an obligation to create communities committed to open-
minded debate. In many cases, good scholarship will require academics to raise difficult 
questions about favored theories. When this happens, it is important to avoid ad hominem 
attacks. More specifically, senior colleagues should not only advocate for the use of 
“dispassionate language”( Locke & Latham, 2009), but actually use this language themselves. 
This would require scholars to curtail their use of disparaging accusations such as “egregious 
scholarship,” “poor scholarship”, “irresponsible”, “unscholarly attacks”, and sentences such as, 
“Ordóñez et al. (2009) would do well to abandon their roles as reporters with an axe to grind and 
embrace good scholarship.”  
When Locke and Latham accuse scholars who raise legitimate concerns about their 
favorite theory of having “breached the principles of good scholarship” they cause harm to the 
“dispassionate” approach to research they purportedly endorse and to good scholarship more 
generally. 
Future Research Directions 
We see our lively debate in the Academy of Management Perspectives as an open call for 
a more systematic investigation of the negative effects of goals that can lead to systematic 
problems in organizations. Thus, we reiterate our call for a program of research to investigate 
how “goals go wild.” We hope that this program of research will be conducted by independent 
researchers from many institutions on many continents. This research should take multiple 
forms, both in and outside the lab, and should cover a range of potential outcomes.  
Three areas with significant prospects for illuminating potential problems are the links 
between goal setting and unethical behavior, goal setting and excessive risk-taking, and goal 
setting and judgment. As financial crises, Ponzi schemes, and the collapse of the automotive 
industry demonstrate, the combination of unethical behavior, risk-taking and poor judgment can 
be toxic. We are not implying that goal setting was the primary cause of the current crises. 
Instead, we suggest that we should develop and sharpen our understanding of those contextual 
factors that produce harmful behaviors. We believe that goal setting research can develop our 
understanding of how some harmful behaviors systematically occur.  
Although empirical evidence has started to accumulate linking goals with negative 
outcomes, we now need to develop theoretical frameworks that can simultaneously explain both 
the positive and the negative outcomes of goals. One good example of this type of research is the 
theoretical framework developed by Barsky (2008). This framework details the cognitive and 
motivational mechanisms of goal setting. Drawing on previous research (Schweitzer et al., 
2004), Barsky (2008) develops a theoretical foundation in which goals hinder ethical recognition 
and promote moral disengagement, leading to unethical behavior.   
In addition, Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) developed a model of goal setting which 
equates goals with reference points, evoking Prospect Theory as a foundation (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  This “goals as reference points” model explains previous goal setting results 
while also predicting new findings such as goal-induced risk taking (Larrick et al., in press). 
Many other questions remain to be addressed. For example, how are goals set in 
competitive environments? Do executives in organizations in extremely competitive 
environments set different goals than do executives in less competitive environments?  How do 
individuals in organizations manipulate the process of setting goals for their own personal 
benefit?  Under what conditions are individuals likely to set the wrong type of goals (e.g., 
quantity rather than quality, revenue rather than profit)?  
One particularly pressing issue is the interplay between culture and goal setting. We think 
there may be a reciprocal interplay between goal setting and organizational context. Not only is 
organizational culture likely to influence goal setting (as Locke & Latham, 2009 suggest), but the 
use of goal setting is also likely to influence organizational culture. For example, when 
executives employ “management by objectives” they communicate an important message about 
the relative importance they place on process and outcomes. 
There is fertile ground to continue investigating the boundary conditions of goal setting, 
especially situations in which goals are applied in the larger context of an organization.  As both 
Locke and Latham (2009) and we point out, focusing on specific goals narrows our focus and 
can lead to unintended but predictable consequences.  Further research in this area may help us 
determine warning signals or pinpoint the problematic conditions under which goals focus our 
attention too narrowly, with too much risk and without ethical constraints.   
Although all four of us are primarily laboratory experimentalists, we believe that the 
method must match the research problem, and that we should always be aware of the limits and 
biases of our methods.  The laboratory allows us to identify new effects and to prove their causal 
pattern.  But, laboratories are weak instruments for measuring the strengths of effects in real 
contexts, especially when the context itself (e.g., organizational culture) is of interest, since 
experimentalists have so much control over the strengths of the manipulations.   
Good scholarship requires that we see the barriers to discovery created by our preferred 
methods.  In the common structure of laboratory goal setting research, the possibility of ignoring 
non-measured outcomes, taking unhealthy risks, and engaging in unethical behavior have 
typically been eliminated as concerns by the nature of the experimental task.   
 Ordóñez et al. (2009) call for future research to investigate both the constructive and the 
harmful effects of goals. This will require new and creative approaches, so that variables not 
explored in the mainstream goal setting area can emerge and be better understood. 
Conclusion 
Soon after Merck launched Vioxx, it became a commercial success. Though a few 
stories, and some experimental evidence, linked Vioxx with heart attacks, executives at Merck 
dismissed these “anecdotes” and continued to promote Vioxx. Over the next five years, 
pharmacists in the U.S. would fill over 80 million Vioxx prescriptions. It was only in 2004, after 
the evidence became incontrovertible that Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market. 
Goal setting, of course, is not Vioxx. As scholars, however, we can use this analogy to 
appreciate the dilemma that Merck’s executives faced. When confronted by anecdotal evidence 
and some causal evidence, how should one react? 
Setting a model for the dispassionate dialogue Locke and Latham (2009) purport to 
support, they ask “Falsehoods and insults aside, are Ordóñez et al. (2009) implying that more 
knowledge about goals is yet to be discovered?” You bet we do!   
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